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INTRODUCTION 
 
Thomas S. Kuhn's aim was to show how adopting a new historiographical approach would 
reveal a structure of scientific progress that was not cumulative but, from the perspective of 
hindsight, a series of rather sudden shifts in beliefs and practices by the scientific community. 
By implementing a historiography that emphasizes sociological and cultural aspects, as well 
as analyzing original texts in the context of their own time, it would become apparent that 
most accounts of science history were hindsight revisions made to look neatly cumulative and 
progressive when in fact they were not. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) serves 
as the main work of literature in support of my thesis. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to compare Kuhn's historiographical framework that he implemented 
on the history of physics with the history of biology to discover if it is meaningful to discuss 
biology from the perspective of a Kuhnian revolutionary historiography. Along with this 
broader aim, there is a secondary and more concrete reason to investigate if there is any merit 
in discussing Theodosius Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origins of Species (1937) as a 
revolutionary text in the sense that it is similar to works like Charles Lyell’s Principles of 
Geology (1830), Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1867) and 
Antoine Lavoisier’s Elementary Treatise of Chemistry (1789) which lay the foundations to 
modern science in their respective fields. This inquiry will also address the status of Charles 
Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859) as a revolutionary text as the significance of his 
work has been the center of much hype and historically questionable claims. By the end of 
this paper I wish to answer the question of whether a Kuhnian historiography is interesting to 
implement to biology. Is it able to shed light to new inquiries and interesting nuances about 
biology and does it help to clarify the still open question of a Darwinian revolution? 
 
In the first chapter I will clarify the main aspects of Kuhn's philosophy: paradigms and 
incommensurability and show why revolutions cannot be understood without semantic 
incommensurability in respect to theory change. In the second chapter I will investigate 
whether the previously discussed notions are applicable to exclusively biological theories and 
concepts. I am going to use three comparisons: is there a visible shift from proto science to 
institutionalized science with a paradigm; does biology exhibit the elements that belong to a 
paradigm; does biology exhibit semantic incommensurability in its key concept of species. 
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1. THOMAS KUHN ON THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 
 
In this chapter I will explain two key concepts in Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science: 
paradigms and semantic incommensurability. As those concepts changed through time, I will 
select the meanings I find most useful and unequivocal to serve as the basis for my analysis of 
biology. At the end of this chapter, I will have clarified which parts of Kuhn's philosophy I 
find useful in analyzing biology and answered the question why semantic incommensurability 
is the crucial component to understanding a Kuhnian revolution in science. 
 
 
1.1. What is a Paradigm? 
 
The term held two meanings in the 1962 release of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
This subchapter will discuss the modification published in the Postscript in 1970 and also its 
difficulties as a circular concept. “Paradigm” is closely related to “normal science” which I 
will use in a way that refers to the process of scientists operating in a paradigm – science as it 
happens. I will not be focusing on the details of normal science, rather my emphasis is on the 
structure of the paradigm itself and the attributes that accompany shifts in paradigms. 
 
 
1.1.1. Was there Always a Paradigm in Science? 
 
In Kuhn's view, there can be a scientist without a paradigm: in fact, there can be something 
that could under sufficient conditions be called “science without a paradigm”, thus it is not a 
necessary condition of science. The important distinction to make is that according to Kuhn, 
the period before normal science does not feature any distinct paradigm-making work, but 
rather lots of metaphysical schools of thought that each tackle a problem dialectically to the 
best of their ability. These schools of thought consisted rightly of what we call “scientists” 
because any definition of “scientist” that excludes even the prominent members of these early 
schools of thought will also exclude the modern day scientist. Their work, however, was 
something less than science. Every scientist had the liberty to build a whole new set of 
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methods and beliefs. There was no common ground for a unified method of conducting 
experiments. In fact, the choice to even take observations and experiments into account was a 
free choice. The typical formula of the situation is as follows: different groups of scientists 
compete for the most complete explanation of nature's phenomena. Their theories bare a 
family resemblance at best, but they usually share some sort of metaphysical framework 
which gives them room to choose their own points of interest and practice of methods. At 
some point, one of these schools of thought becomes successful in having the capacity to 
explain more natural phenomena than the others and draws followers that use those principles 
and methods for further scientific pursuits. That is when a paradigm forms. (Kuhn 1970: 10-
15) 
 
Without a paradigm, facts seem equal and fact gathering is rather random. There comes a 
point where the pool of scattered gathered data will facilitate the emergence of a paradigm. An 
example of random fact gathering would be the numerous descriptions written about flora and 
fauna without the backbone of evolutionary biology to look at the findings in a phylogenetic 
perspective. In contrast to random fact gathering, normal science displays guided pursuits and 
experiments. Kuhn gives an example of some scientists believing electricity to be a fluid. This 
belief directed them to experiments where they tried to bottle it. In this way a sort of common 
ground is established, thus displaying the role of collective work and background beliefs that 
guide experimentation. It also gives the scientist new energy and perseverance to take on 
more time demanding and difficult tasks. Natural sciences usually started their institutional 
era with a single paradigm arising from one of the classic texts like Newton's Principia and 
Franklin's Electricity. That text also served to be the revolutionary jump from a pre-
paradigmatic science to a revolutionary science. This process had two distinct results. First 
one was the quiet disappearance of older competing schools of thought. The members of those 
communities either integrated their work into the early paradigm driven science, or they were 
neglected. The second consequence of institutionalization was that scientific work became 
unintelligible to the common educated person. A person in the 18th century who had the access 
to be tutored in the Seven Liberal Arts in addition to Greek and Latin found himself to be 
lacking of sufficient knowledge in mathematics and current naturalism. Before 
institutionalization, written work was often presented in a way that contemporary educated 
men would have been able to understand and follow. After that, the regular form of writing 
transformed from the system-building book to the short article which held the premise that 
whoever reads it already knows the central ideas and problems of that certain field in which 
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the article was produced. (15-22) 
  
 
1.1.2. The 1970 Revision of “Paradigm” 
 
After the first publication, it became apparent that the term “paradigm” was used in two 
different ways: broadly as a set of theories, beliefs, values and methods; and specifically as 
the puzzle-solving element of normal science which is a consequence of a theory. More 
specifically, this narrower meaning of paradigm denotes the way in which science-making is 
governed by experiments and their results rather than rules. In response to criticism from his 
peers, he revised “paradigm” and called it the “disciplinary matrix” of science. These guiding 
experiments, initially also called a paradigm, he later called “exemplars” - one of the four 
elements in the matrix. Another problem remained: it became apparent that his use of 
“scientific community” and “paradigm” seemed circular which was an obvious target for 
criticism. It seemed like scientific communities were defined by sharing a matrix, whereas the 
contents of the matrix were defined by the scientific community. In this section I will discuss 
the revised definition of a paradigm and the circularity of the community-matrix relation. 
 
Let us break down the disciplinary matrix. It has four elements: laws, exemplars, metaphysics 
and values. First, it consists of statements like F=ma, ΔG=ΔH-TΔS, “energy transfers from 
one state to another”. These can be understood as laws, axioms and definitions. Kuhn said that 
definitions and laws had a fundamental difference: laws could be revised and modified bit by 
bit, definitions as tautologies could not. He suspected that all revolutions displayed a process 
whereby in order to implement a new law the definitions of the constituents of those laws had 
to be revised. (183) He took the statement about laws and definitions as common knowledge 
by the way he presented it. When something is added to a definition then with this act, the 
definition itself changes - that is self-evident. In the case of scientific laws, it is not that 
obvious how he came to the conclusion that they could be modified bit by bit still retaining 
their meaning. After all, a scientific law is an abstraction of some causal relation between 
natural phenomena (also arguably a mathematical truth not tied to the empirical world) and 
when one changes the constituents of that law, it no longer portrays the same thing that it did 
before. I believe he meant that by convention laws can be extended by giving them special 
case extensions. One example would be that the Ohm's law does not apply on heated rods 
inside a light bulb, or the Mendelian laws do not apply in meiosis where selection has favored 
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other means of genetic division. I also agree that the elements in the form of a law define 
themselves by being in the form of a law. This is a psychological statement: when a law is 
formulated, it requires empirical proving but as time goes by, young scientists come to define 
the constituents of a law with the help of the law. I believe this to be one of the most insightful 
observations Kuhn made about science. I also believe it to be the reason some philosophers 
have rejected that F=ma is anything more than analytical (Brigandt, Love 2014). This brings 
to the point how laws as part of the matrix are susceptible to semantic incommensurability. 
When the acceptance of a law requires one to accept a different meaning about its elements 
than was the previous convention, then it is a perfect example of how some forms of old and 
new laws do not have common measure. The form of a law stays the same but parts of it have 
been renewed. This is the reason why incommensurability often stays hidden. If whole sets of 
elements in the disciplinary matrix are switched, then old and new matrixes are 
incommensurable.    
 
The second element of the disciplinary matrix is its metaphysical aspect (Kuhn 1970: 184). 
This includes notions that are not a direct result of a theory but may or may not guide 
scientists. An example would be the numerous interpretations of the world in theoretical 
physics which postulates phenomena that could not be tested in any way possible. Belief in 
them can guide a scientist whose field is theoretical physics but for a person studying liquids 
it makes no difference whether there are ten or eleven dimensions. So belief in metaphysical 
concepts that can be abstracted from contemporary knowledge is not mandatory for a scientist 
who does no research these concepts. The metaphysical aspect of a paradigm rather tends to 
express outside of science and attract ideologically minded thinkers and philosophers. 
Another example is the question of teleology in biology. Even if Daniel Dennet claims for 
certain that evolution is a Turing machine, non-teleological and not guided by ultimate causal 
meaning (Dennet 2012), in practice, unless the existence of a creator or teleology of 
organisms becomes the center of research, like in the case of proving intelligent design, a 
biologist can freely believe that whatever she is researching was set in motion by God and it 
will not affect the work in any way.  
 
A third element of the matrix is a collection of values. Kuhn stressed that values as major 
contributors to paradigm-change did not render science a subjective irrational enterprise that 
had little to do with careful reasoning or fact. Rather, values were subject to and resulted from 
careful reasoning and consideration. That science should be conservative, that theories should 
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be simple and clear, that science should not/should be useful to society are all values. (Kuhn 
1970: 186) In physics, it is far less evident that values are major contributors to what should 
be an object of research. It is most evident in sociology and also easily noticeable in 
psychology and biology. By being aware of some new part of nature as worthy of pursuit, the 
results of that inquiry could trigger a revolution. Mendelian laws of heritability could not have 
succeeded without the Darwinian paradigm. If Mendel had not valued a quiet life and 
methodological testing to find out whether there was a reason for the appearance of different 
colored petals of pea plants throughout generations, then his landmark work on genetics 
would not have come about. It was again a matter of values that at first the scientific 
community did not take him seriously and that only afterwards, in the light of Darwin's 
works, he was rediscovered by Hugo de Vries and Carl Correns who thought it useful to study 
the old works of forgotten scientists. In contrast, there are some branches of science, like 
computer science, where reading old works written more than a decade ago hold no value.  
 
The fourth and the last element in the matrix is the collection of exemplars. These are the 
concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific education, 
whether in laboratories, on examinations, or at the ends of chapters in science textbooks. This 
element of the disciplinary matrix is especially important in physics as it determines the “fine-
structure” of the scientific community. Exemplars are the problems to which equations are 
applied to reach accepted solutions. As the education of a scientist progresses, her arsenal of 
equations and example problems grows and the use of these is different in sub-disciplines. 
(187) In the book, this was the stricter meaning of the paradigm. Science does not share rules, 
instead it shares exemplars. Rules stem from exemplars but exemplars themselves can be 
implemented without rules. Kuhn argues that a case of family resemblance restricts scientists 
to exemplar-specific research. One does not need to know what exactly gave the accepted 
methods and objects of research their status, the methods and objects need only to follow 
convention and tradition. He provides two examples: first is the fact that it is very difficult for 
researchers to discover the rules that govern science. Secondly, scientists do not learn 
abstractions, theories and laws as such for themselves. Instead, these are learned through 
application in an embedded manner. (43-50) 
 
The revision to define the disciplinary matrix made Kuhn's idea of the paradigm much clearer 
and answered the question of how paradigms can be bigger and smaller in scope. He was 
using the strict meaning of the paradigm which is that exemplars can be bigger and smaller. 
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Through specialization, it is possible that a smaller change in exemplars can leave other fields 
unaffected. An equation in some field that is added to its problem solving methods or is 
neglected, may be irrelevant to other fields who would use the equation in a different manner. 
The same exemplars can carry different meaning to different sub-disciplines. It also points to 
the conclusion that smaller-scale paradigm change signifies in most part changes in exemplars 
and perhaps in values and metaphysical commitments. A large scale paradigm shift means 
instead a shift in the whole disciplinary matrix where the key concepts of a theory become 
incommensurable with respect to the old theory, and forces a revision in metaphysics, values 
and exemplars. 
 
A paradigm, synonymous with disciplinary matrix, is a set of laws, exemplars, values and 
metaphysics that the scientific community shares. A scientific community is a set of scientists 
who have decided to study the world under a paradigm. Is the definition's circularity a 
problem? It was and is a problem to those philosophers who were/are influenced by Positivist 
approaches to defining concepts in a manner that should exclude logical ambiguities. Kuhn 
was a sociologically minded historian/philosopher and his views that one can't characterize 
the logically inconsistent and fluid phenomena of human enterprise by postulating logically 
neat concepts is very evident in his critique of Popper and the Positivists and their historical 
reductionist views on laws and theory. By attempting to characterize science as it was, not 
how it should ideally be, he applied his concepts from a much more subjective standpoint: 
science cannot be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, science is what people think 
science is and the most authority over what science is was owned by scientists. By 
abandoning static definitions of scientists and science and instead approaching things 
historically it seems that strict formalizations are rendered incomplete and too strict to 
adequately describe the status quo. For this reason, the appeal to circularity is exactly what 
one would expect from philosophers whose philosophy Kuhn tried to distance himself from in 
favor of a different approach. This is the first reason why I do not take the accusation of 
circularity very seriously.  
 
The second reason why I do not take the accusation seriously is closely related to the first 
reason but with emphasis on the idea that when a philosopher approaches to characterize a 
phenomenon from a social standpoint, the characterization of the phenomenon is tied to 
human cognition. Cognition has the inescapable property of circularity embedded in it: the 
world is something that causes us to sense it and our senses shape the world for us. 
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Institutions are defined by their members and sets of members are defined by institutional 
membership, very robustly speaking. Institutional membership surely does not characterize 
the members fully; they are a part of different sets: men, women, parents, Europeans, Asians 
etc. Institutions are upheld by their members and the content of them is subject to change if 
the members decide so. Members are in no way fixed to the institutions, they may leave and 
thus leave the set with the help of which them being in that institution is being defined. 
Science as an institution, upheld by verbal convention and physical buildings like colleges 
and private corporations, and therefore moldable and definable by its members that are not 
fixed to that institution, is what gives this position its legitimacy.  
 
Those, who still have concerns with the circularity, I propose to define the relation between 
the paradigm and the community in a one way relation. If there is a paradigm, then there must 
be scientists upholding it. My premise is that I grant existence to human made theoretical 
structures through their use. If there are scientists then it does not follow that there must be a 
paradigm. Scientists are not dependent on the disciplinary matrix, for Kuhn also permits 
scientists to exist without paradigms. Even if scientists gather inside a community sharing a 
paradigm, the community is not dependent on the disciplinary matrix for they may change 
their beliefs and conventions in their entirety and still call it science and we would still have 
the liberty of calling the whole enterprise of what they do a paradigm. The fact that a group of 
scientists are working to uncover aspects of the world under a disciplinary matrix, is 
contingent and causally linked to numerous social and economic factors. It is not the case that 
a disciplinary matrix ushers scientists into existence.  
 
As the disciplinary matrix and the community that upholds it are both fluent, a simple circular 
statement “a paradigm is defined by its community and the community is defined by its 
paradigm” is very misleading and unnecessary for it lacks dimension and pragmatic value and 
ignores the de facto circular and untidy naming by convention. Once again, the aim is to 
describe what we call science, not to pose normative constrictions on it. Now that I have 
cleared the basic concepts, from this point onward I will use “matrix” synonymously with 
“paradigm”.  
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1.1.3. The Connection of Normal Science and a Paradigm: Why Revolutions become 
inevitable 
 
An overview of normal science is necessary to later introduce the discussion on 
incommensurability. In this section I will summarize Kuhn's thoughts on normal science and 
revolutions which already touch on the subject of theory accumulation and reductionism.  
 
The term “normal science” means the practice of science that is firmly based on an acceptable 
foundation of observations and theories. It is not only descriptive, containing the classic texts 
and an account of discoveries from the past, but also normative, for it dictates the nature of 
scientific problems and the appropriate questions and puzzles to be answered and solved. The 
aim of normal science is to enforce the accepted disciplinary matrix with special emphasis on 
exemplars by further characterization and specification of already known phenomena. This 
allows scientists to study certain topics to the absolute detail, which would otherwise be 
rendered much more difficult due to the sophisticated nature of the problems at hand. One of 
the aims of normal science is to take a class of important facts provided by the paradigm and 
perfect the knowledge of the properties of those facts. (30-34) 
 
Scientific revolutions are “taken to be those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which 
an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one” (92).  The term 
“revolution” is not randomly selected by Kuhn for shock value. In the wake of political 
revolutions, people lose confidence in institutions and some members of society start to 
behave in eccentric ways. Soon those eccentrics will propose a positive program which aims 
to provide solutions to a widening crisis. At that moment society is broken into groups which 
compete for establishing hegemony. The parallels with what has been previously written are 
inescapable. Much like political revolutions happen extra-politically, outside institutions, the 
choice for paradigm happens outside the former paradigm and is therefore also a community 
issue. The circularity of everyone arguing in their own paradigm is not a problem. They can 
adequately characterize the way the world would look and how science is to be conducted. 
The choice between paradigms cannot be explained through logic or theory-experimentation 
analysis. The choice comes from subjective and pragmatic considerations. (91-94) 
 
A theory can develop from three classes of phenomena: phenomena already covered by a 
paradigm, phenomena that require paradigm extension and anomalous phenomena. The last 
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one is the source of a new theory. A new theory gives predictions that are logically 
incompatible with the predictions of the older theory. It means that a new theory should be 
different from the old one in such a way that it is in no way reducible to the old one. The 
counter argument usually goes in some form of the following: older theory A and newer 
theory B are not contradictory because both are still used in their respective fields. We now 
know that A is a special case of B. No theory can contradict with its special case. In addition, 
sometimes scientists make extraordinary claims about the world, leaning on a particular older 
theory. This may show the older theory as incompatible with the new one, when in reality, the 
older theory never had the explanatory scope for the claims that had been made to have proper 
cause or foundation. Kuhn counters this by stating that, if this sort of positivist ideas of 
science would be true, there would be no new discovery or, more ironically, science would be 
reduced to a kind of pre-paradigmatic state where separate scientists practice science, but the 
overall outcome would not be science. If scientists really held to the strict logical scope of 
their theories there would be no accidents which lead to new discoveries. (94-101) 
 
As for the arguments considering derivability, Kuhn states that in order for one theory to be 
derived from the other there should be no need to redefine concepts which point to the same 
phenomena in both theories. If one has to do that, then the two theories are not linked in that 
manner. This applies to the Newtonian-Einsteinian shift. In order to say that Newtonian 
physics is a special case of Einsteinian physics one has to ignore the fact that besides 
redefining narrower concepts one also has to redefine the understanding of the fundamental 
structure of elements from which the universe is made of. The essence of a scientific 
revolution is the need to redefine the conceptual framework through which scientists work. 
The reconceptualization is always something that can be undertaken in hindsight with the 
guidance of the current theory. (101-103) 
 
 
1.2. Incommensurability as the Heart of Paradigm Change 
 
In this subchapter I will show how incommensurability, tightly woven with the 
epistemological argument, is at the heart of Kuhn's theory on paradigm change. I will go over 
the three stages of incommensurability that Kuhn developed over the years. It is the acquiring 
of a different world view brought on by a gestalt switch that gives evidence of 
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incommensurability between old and new paradigms. Although I will be focusing on semantic 
incommensurability, the epistemological aspect of a paradigm change is very important as the 
way language is used and perceived is part of our cognition and therefore applies to the 
epistemological claims that I will introduce in the next section. 
 
 
1.2.1. The Epistemology of Scientific Revolutions 
 
A considerable portion of Kuhn's account is tied to the epistemology of science. He wrote 
about the difference between seeing the world through the old and the new paradigm as seeing 
different worlds, although the world itself remains the same. He was better able to articulate it 
in a way that the world consisted of objects of our sensations. Neurologically speaking, we 
have evidential reason to believe that people have different sensations from the same objects 
and the same objects cause different sensations in people. We also have strong experimental 
reason to believe that education and more broadly culture is an important factor how a person 
has sensations about some object. Since sense data is all we have to go on, we define our 
world completely in the realm of it. If sense data differs drastically from person to person, it is 
quite safe to admit that the expression “living in different worlds” no longer sounds as 
esoteric as it might have earlier without proper context. (Kuhn 1970: 192-193) 
 
The central argument he gave was that when we sense something, it already is an interpretive 
process, as opposed to the idea that our sensing is pure from any higher order brain activity. I 
would like to present a scientific example from contemporary neurology: up to this day, 
scientists have difficulty understanding how sense data is gathered and formed in a way that is 
meaningful to us. It is known that sense data is interpreted through a propagation of neuronal 
signals between different parts of the brain. First the data provokes a neuronal response in the 
parts of the brain that are not associated with higher order brain function. The pattern of 
activity is subsequently propagated into parts which are. From those parts, additional 
feedback gets sent to the earlier sensory areas. This manifests in a series of feedforward and 
feedback loops going back and forth the functionally higher and lower order brain areas. Parts 
of the brain not associated with direct sense data thus effectively modulate the neuronal 
activity in areas that are. Another side to this is that sensing in its common form is already a 
process that we are aware of. So it already presupposes that our experience has gone through 
some centers of the brain that deal with conscious or subconscious interpretation. 
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(Kafaligonul; Breitmeyer; Ögmen 2015) Another example is the phenomenon of cognitive 
penetration. An experiment conducted by Delk and Fillenbaum in 1965 showed that test 
subjects' color perception was skewed depending on the shape that the color was presented in. 
What was reported to be orange in the case of geometric shapes was instead reported to be 
more red when presented in the shape of a heart, which is commonly depicted to be red within 
western culture. (Delk; Fillenbaum 1965: 290) I believe these two cases support Kuhn's view 
that sensing itself is an interpretative process.  
 
 
1.2.2. Semantic incommensurability 
 
Incommensurability has been one of the most talked about issues on the topic of scientific 
revolutions. Revolutions occur when the majority of the old and new disciplinary matrix 
become such that logical bridges between them cannot be constructed. It does not mean that 
there are no good or objective reasons why to favor one or the other. The existence of 
incommensurability does not point to irrationality. It does, however, point to the matter that 
when there is no neutral operation for choosing a better theory, values come into play which 
behave in a different way than a simple procedural follow-through from premises to 
conclusions. The problem is not in hazy semantics or irrationality. The core of the problem is 
whether opposing sides come to an agreement on what is denoted by some term. It is about 
convincing the other side to implement a whole new system of links and associations. As 
previously discussed, the change has to go through all at once. This poses a problem: Kuhn 
did not endorse a complete incommensurability like Paul Feyerabend did, but he still claimed 
that the gestalt switch has a complete grasp. I will pay attention to this difficulty in a few 
paragraphs. 
 
First I would like to introduce the first account of semantic incommensurability that Kuhn 
gave in his book. A new paradigm incorporates much of the old paradigm's methods and 
terminology but the conflict, the incommensurability of those terms, lies in the way those 
terms were previously used. Behind a meaning there is a whole network of other meanings 
and connections. When Copernicus used the word 'earth' and stated that earth was a mobile 
body, his opponents rejected his claims, for 'earth' was a synonym for 'immobile'. Only after 
changing a set of other terms as well, may the idea of earth moving be acceptable and even 
unquestionable for science. This is summed up as the incommensurability of terminology. 
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(Kuhn 1970: 149-150) This implies that meaning is not embedded strictly in the process of 
referring to an empirical phenomena by universal means, rather meaning is achieved in 
relation with other meanings. By changing a meaning of a term, its immediate network of 
meanings changes as well.  
 
What brings about the wish to use terms in a different manner? A central aspect of 
incommensurability regards the point made by Kuhn that scientists operate in different 
worlds. Here the epistemological argument given previously becomes relevant. He wrote that 
the world itself has not changed in a strict sense but scientists are not able to see the same 
things when looking at a certain aspect of the world. Due to the fact that e.g. two 
characterizations of a law are incommensurable, the conversion from one to another cannot 
take place step by step or by the use of careful calculation or logic. The gestalt switch must 
take place fully and all at once. (150) And since our vocabulary is limited and its use tied to 
convention – it is easier to use the same word with a different meaning than make up a new 
word, semantic change will suffice to embed new information in our conventional speech. 
One example to illustrate the incommensurability of working in different worlds through 
defining parts of a system differently is to look at mathematical systems. Anyone who has 
either for professional or recreational purposes, tried to abandon the decimal system point of 
view to adopt a 6-base, 2-base, or, 12-base view of mathematical calculus, finds it odd at best, 
extremely nerve-wrecking at worst. The old way of understanding the meaning of numbers is 
of no use in a 12-based system. In fact, the way we mark the 12-based system, – with a 1 and 
a 2 ,– is already understood in the decimal system. In English, the words “eleven” and 
“twelve” are remnants from a non-decimal based way of counting and doing calculus. 
“Thirteen” and “fourteen” already have a meaning of one full round and three and four more. 
In a 12-based system, the numbers 10, 11, 12 can easily be replaced with other symbols for 
clarity. In fact, it helps to operate and understand the process of adding, negating, dividing etc. 
better. Adopting the otherworldly view of the 12-based system forces one to abandon familiar 
logic of mathematics and understanding the world, embrace the change on all levels at once 
and have a gestalt switch because of it. This kind of psychological transition is easier for a 
young person who has an open mind and is not burdened by long tradition of thinking.  
 
The examples Kuhn and I made are quite intuitive and lack any strict formal interpretation. 
That is because he did not focus strictly on language. Since Kuhn expressed his views on the 
matter quite laconically in his book, it made them susceptible to criticism. That pressed Kuhn 
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to philosophically refine his position. Howard Sankey has written about the subject. In his 
1993 article Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability, he wrote about the ways in 
which Kuhn modified his work in later years and how the most understood and famous 
meaning of incommensurability was not the one that he himself endorsed during his later 
years. According to Sankey, Kuhn's position on the matter had had three phases: the early 
account in his original book, the intermediary phase in the 1970 Postscript where 
incommensurability becomes a semantic notion and the third phase where 
incommensurability becomes a refined semantic and linguistic concept – “a failure of 
translation in a localized cluster of interdefined terms”. (Sankey 1993: 760) In order to show 
my support for any one of those three accounts, I will clarify their differences.  
 
The first phase was the broadest and seemed to commit Kuhn to some form of idealism. This 
was because of his explanation of world change. The ability to spot anomalies and the need to 
construct a new paradigm is due to the fact that these scientists are living in a different world 
and this world view is facilitated by observational language which cannot be logically linked 
to the language used to describe the world in the old paradigm. The incommensurability 
expresses in two ways: words differing in terms of their referent and words differing in ways 
that they point to a different position in the overall web of meanings. Most of all, 
incommensurability expresses itself in a broad world view switch which is best described as 
operating in two different worlds. Aside from seeming like a very nice standard account of 
simple observation language incommensurability, much like Feyerabend's view, (Oberheim, 
Hoyningen-Huene 2013) Kuhn took a step back to state that not everything is 
incommensurable between two paradigms after the world change, rather just the most 
important and defining concepts of a theory. This contradicted with his dramatic claim that 
paradigms are a filter for perception and that the change in Gestalt is complete and not 
achievable by piece-by-piece analyzing. Sankey's comment adds to my summary:  
 
“In sum, not even the conceptual component of Kuhn's original diffuse notion of 
incommensurability admits of unified analysis. Paradigms which are 
incommensurable due to conceptual variance are not derivable from one another; in 
some sense, they may even be about different worlds; or perhaps they simply fail to 
have common reference. These disparate elements begin to coalesce during Kuhn's 
transitional phase, which we will now consider” (Sankey 1993: 765).  
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In the end of his Postscript (200-204), his transitional account was more focused on language. 
Incommensurability is an issue in translation failure and that is because there is no neutral 
language to compare theories in, when incommensurable. Deciding which theory is favorable 
comes on the basis of values and pragmatic concerns. What exactly did this view entail that 
the old one did not? He clarified that he did not mean that communication would break down 
completely and that the empirical world still stayed the same after a paradigm change which 
cleared him of alleged idealism. Communities should try to translate each other's positions. 
Although, even after translating, the experience of a person formerly in the old paradigm 
would still be different. He would be a tourist, whereas the younger generation would be 
natives in that theory. One cannot access the other's world view by translating alone. “Instead, 
at some point in the process of learning to translate, he finds that the transition has occurred, 
that he has slipped into the new language without a decision having been made. /../ The 
conversion experience that I have likened to a gestalt switch remains, therefore, at the heart of 
the revolutionary process” (Kuhn 1970: 204) As Kuhn turns to translation failures, he draws 
parallels from Quine's theory of translation indeterminacy but, as Sankey agrees, does so in a 
flawed way. While according to Quine all translations are of equal measure as there are no 
true translation rules, Kuhn deviates from this view by treating the difficulties in finding the 
“right” translation as products of different ontological categories posed by different theories. 
In doing so he posits an empirical standard against which the testing of righter translations 
would be possible. (Sankey 1993: 787) The difficulty that cannot be overcome with this new 
emphasis is that now translation becomes the central aspect of incommensurability but he 
never provided sufficient explanation as to how these translational failures occur. His first 
account of logical bridging seemed a much better position and with a bit of tweaking, much 
less ambiguous than the initial representation in his book. 
 
Kuhn's third position redeems the shortcomings of the second account. Sankey gives an 
overview of the third position: translation failure occurs in localized clusters of interdefined 
terms. That is called local incommensurability. Parts outside this local cluster have common 
measure and can be translated but since the terms are interrelated, the inability to translate has 
a “holistic effect”. The translation locally fails because meanings are in relations with other 
terms in the interdefined set. These concepts in the cluster cannot be translated piece by piece 
because they would lack the necessary conceptual relations in the other theory. (Sankey 1993: 
772) I would like to support Kuhn's third position with the following points, although he did 
not approach this problem from the angle I am going to take. It is an argument from the 
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perspective of the people who are building a new theory.  
 
Between old and new disciplinary matrixes, there are terms that are incommensurable and 
there are terms that are not. The ones that are not incommensurable I call “anchor terms”. 
They are anchored to the old paradigm but through them a new paradigm is constructed where 
the associations and laws between phenomena drastically change also giving rise to new 
metaphysical commitments and values. By the time the process from revolutionary science 
settles down to normal science and final wider disputes are settled, the semantic 
incommensurability even in anchor terms may come about but not necessarily. Kuhn agreed 
that there was a period between revolutionary and normal science and further paradigm-
clearing work is done during this period. It is possible that the anchor terms are also revised to 
produce a more coherent new theory. This claim stems from my understanding that neither 
Kuhn nor I endorse a view that there cannot be a world outside our perception but our 
perception and our language are the only things we have to go on. I will clarify this thought in 
the next paragraph. 
 
The first premise for my support comes from the fact that puzzles, observational data and 
values are the basis for developing a new paradigm by the young minds in the field. I think of 
theory building as connecting different dots to draw a coherent picture. If some dots remain 
unconnected by associations and laws, they become problems for the younger community 
who have not had lifelong commitments to perfecting the details of the picture. By 
approaching science through the old paradigm, it is impossible for them to approach those 
problems by not committing to anything that has been taught to them very methodically. By 
holding onto some aspects of the old paradigm they are able to construct a new way of 
connecting dots that differs drastically from what was before but has some of the same 
elements as their basis.  Theoretically, only a complete outsider could usher a theory based on 
an entirely different language but as we know, this is not the case in real life institutionalized 
science.  
 
The second premise comes from the theory of meaning mostly known to be endorsed by 
Jacques Derrida in his work Of Grammatology (1997). A word, even when about simple 
material phenomena like tables or cows is never as simple as merely pointing to a table or a 
cow and saying that there it is, that corresponds to a “table” and “cow”. There are no means to 
bind language to the world. Words hold references to other words which means that meaning 
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is gained in relation to other words and their meanings. It is an inevitability that terms beyond 
anchor terms lose their reductionist potential and also translational capacity in comparison to 
the old paradigm because their position in a network of new associations, laws, phenomena 
and metaphysical commitments have changed and the meaning of words depicting these new 
patterns change with them. In addition, a very important note about paradigms in the broader 
sense is that paradigms never solve all the problems which give room for inconsistency within 
the paradigm and in this way old ideas and seemingly incompatible notions remain. 
 
From the perspective of linguistic webs, linguistic theory and exemplar-dependence, the 
claims that Kuhn made about cognition being an interpretative process seem sound. The 
conditions for a Kuhnian revolution come from a shift that cannot be extensions of the same 
language or mere modifications of it. A Kuhnian revolution has to exhibit deep 
epistemological and semantic shifts and analyzed with the benefit of hindsight. This will be 
the key conclusion that will guide the analysis in the second chapter.  
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2. ON BIOLOGY 
 
In this chapter I will focus on all the aspects discussed in the first chapter: pre-paradigm 
science, paradigms and semantic incommensurability. My aim is to compare Kuhn's view of 
science with the historical knowledge about biology and see if there are any similarities that 
would justify a Kuhnian view on the science of life. In the subchapter on paradigms, I will 
draw parallels between the constituents of the disciplinary matrix (laws, exemplars, values, 
metaphysics). I chose the most central term “species” to inquire how it has changed in the 
course of different theories and ages. By the end of this chapter I will have answered the 
question of whether it is meaningful, in the sense that it opens up new lines of inquiry and 
aspects of science, to discuss biology in a Kuhnian framework.  
 
 
2.1. The Pre-Paradigm Period of Biology 
 
The pre-paradigm period of science or proto-science is illustrated by the absence of an 
institutionalized network of people who share the same disciplinary matrix or aspects of a 
wider matrix. Early researchers were people who resembled modern scientists in the 
procedural sense: they dealt with explaining the world by adopting some sort of method and 
tried to explain natural phenomena to the best of their ability. The fruit of their labor, however, 
was something very different from what we are used to calling “science” in the modern era. 
Kuhn had the same view about proto-scientists working in the early days: “This is the period 
/…/ during which individuals practice science, but in which the results of their enterprise do 
not add up to science as we know it” (Kuhn 1970: 163). Texts were written in a way that I call 
“world building” which means that the presentation of ideas and introductions presupposed an 
audience that was not automatically familiar with what the author wanted to write about. The 
majority of the arguments were formed in a step by step manner rather than the common 
knowledge presupposing article of contemporary science. I do not mean to say that these men 
from the past were somehow lonely islands in a sea of an ideological or informational void. 
The Aristotelian influence and the assumption of a basic classical education were of course 
strongly there. Thinkers in the Middle-Age tended to write difficult and dense texts about the 
natural world that usually started with the allocution to God like the piece on time and species 
by Thomas Aquinas (Rickaby 2005: 13-21). What they lacked was a more detailed and 
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sophisticated background system of knowledge that would have been the product of thorough 
research, peer reviewed and heavily institutionalized. I will present five examples of works of 
biology to support my claim that in the study of organisms the characteristics of a proto-
science lasted from the scholastic era well into the 20th century.   
 
The Aristotelian philosopher and botanist Andrea Cesalpino (1519-1603) is known for his 
original and thorough descriptions of flowering plants. He classified plants according to their 
morphology and physiology, rather than on their medicinal properties or just alphabetically. 
He used the fruits and seeds of plants as the basis for his classification and is thus worth 
noting as a very talented thinker who differed in his specific method of botanical 
classification while still retaining his Aristotelian background as a philosopher. Like other 
thinkers in his time, his theory about the circulation of blood, remained purely speculative and 
could not be demonstrated by experiments. (Catholic Encyclopedia) Ernst Mayr has also 
written that Cesalpino's magnum opus, De plantis, was written in a familiar logical division 
that was known to every educated person and directly drawn from Aristotle (Mayr 1982: 158–
159). I made him an example of a medieval naturalist because his classification of plant 
organisms was innovative. However, after his passing, many others provided their own 
classificational systems from scratch which illustrates the foundational difference between 
pre-paradigmatic and paradigmatic science.  
 
Charles Darwin and his On the Origin of Species is a perfect example of the major 
groundwork texts that did not presuppose an ingrained common set of commitments. Even in 
the 19th century, when the Linnean Society of London had been around for some time (it was 
founded in 1778) and one could rightfully argue that some sort of community had arisen, the 
introduction and composition of Darwins's Origins had still the world-building characteristics 
that Kuhn referred to in the second chapter of his book. The One Long Argument is an easily 
readable book and its introduction displays a similar style of personal confessions and general 
information like so many naturalist works at the time. Unlike the dense and highly 
philosophical works from medieval naturalists (sacral teleology lasted well into the 19th 
century, of course), it resembles more of a book like today's popular science writing: not too 
simplistic but not quite what one can read in the form of a modern article in Cell, Nature or 
Science. It was a book that an educated person was able to read very well. Despite becoming 
famous and giving rise to several wide-scale discussions outside the academia, it did not start 
a revolutionary science in a way Lyell's Chemistry did. Evolution was a topic reserved for 
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public lectures or an interesting idea that some men pursued but not necessarily in a Darwinist 
fashion. A paradigm initiating text allowed for the scientists to group under a set of 
commitments that could be concluded from that text. That enabled them to study the world in 
detail. After Darwin this did not happen for a couple of generations. It did not provide enough 
ground on its own. Genetics took off in a separate field of study, highly mathematical and 
outside the Darwinian evolution that were broadly theoretical and broad at the time. It is a 
widely held belief that Mendelian genetics and Darwinism were seen as contradictory at the 
time as it is frequently addressed in genetics classes and by historians (Ceccarelli 2001: 13-
60). Resembling metaphysical frameworks rather than evidence based precise notions, the 
community dealing with the study of organisms was still very much divided between different 
beliefs and disciplines and in the center of that was the problem of speciation. 
 
Theodosius Dobzhansky and his book Genetics and the Origin of Species (1937), as indicated 
by the title, marked the synthesis of the knowledge accumulated from genetics and Darwin's 
theory of evolution through natural selection. From the perspective of proto-science versus 
mature science, I believe this to be the landmark text to be thorough enough in its arguments 
and mathematics to apply as the base for revolutionary science and to be the initiator of a 
biology that we know today. As Darwin lacked the notion a hereditary vessel – the gene – to 
support his theory, theories like neo-Lamarckism were favored because they did not postulate 
something that carried hereditary modifications, instead organisms were modified by their 
environment directly. After rediscovering Mendel, whose work had been another quite 
isolated bundle of independent ideas in the tradition of the researchers and thinkers before 
modern science, the case for genetics and evolution as compatible domains of research could 
be made in a satisfactory manner backed by calculations through sophisticated mathematics. 
Where Darwin could not provide detailed explanations to speciation, Dobzhansky could use 
the pool of knowledge accumulated by naturalists and geneticists to postulate that 
evolutionary theory should account for variations in all aspects of the domain of life: from the 
individual to the species. The goal was to use experimental data from genetics to demonstrate 
the validity of his claims and by extension, Darwin's and all of his supporters claims. He 
succeeded, though partially, and is now considered one of the most important scientists in 
evolutionary biology and his text is presented to young students to be as important as 
Darwin's. Coincidentally his own famous words echo the notion of a paradigm that puts 
scientific research into perspective. It was the title of his essay “Nothing in Biology Makes 
Sense Except in the Light of Evolution” (Dobzhansky: 1973). 
Rohtmets, Revolutions in Biology 
23 
 
James Watson's and Francis Crick's famous paper on the structure of the acid that is 
responsible for overall most heritability is considered as a revolutionary paper. In this case, 
the work of significance was a continuation of research that had started with recognizing that 
DNA was the building block of life. Published on the 25th of April 1953 as an article in 
Nature, it lacked the characteristics of previous examples. Not readable by a layman and 
strictly for the educated scientist, published in a medium used by the scientific community, it 
bespoke of the normal conduct in a mature science. Driven by the knowledge that this 
substance is present in viruses and cells as the mechanism of heritability, the very young field 
of molecular biology was studying the properties of this substance for the knowledge it might 
contain about evolution and therefore life in general. I propose that this achievement is not 
revolutionary in a Kuhnian sense for it was a major breakthrough in an already established 
program as multiple teams in different universities were conducting similar research. As 
Michael Ruse also put it in his paper about the Darwinian Revolution, normal science does 
seem a bit unexciting, a phase between the interesting bits in science (Ruse 2009: 10040) and 
this makes people want to claim “revolutionary” for something or the other. I understand how 
it might seems so, but I disagree in the sense that the most detailed and illuminating work is 
done during the period of normal science. The Higg's boson was a famous discovery but there 
was nothing revolutionary about it. It was posed by the theory and finally there was the 
accepted level of probability in measurements to state that this is the Higg's boson. The 
“molecular revolution” is called such because it was a major achievement of a paradigm 
driven science and opened up a whole new range of study. Still, it was not like the discovery 
of X-rays, which were not supposed to be there and thus ushered a change in theory. The 
structure of DNA as a complementary double helix was received well by geneticists and was 
almost universally accepted only a few years later. It was a success after anticipation, not an 
anomaly. Discussing the explosion of molecular biology in the way that I have does not 
undermine its scientific significance, it just points to the different usage of the term 
“revolution”. Philosophers will always have the liberty to use revolution in a much broader 
sense and it is definitely being done as well. 
 
To further illustrate the before and after effect of paradigm driven science, I would briefly like 
to discuss the work of Motoo Kimura and his team. He researched molecular evolution and 
applied mathematical models to theorize about the mechanisms of population diversification 
like the genetic load. He published his very influential article on neutralistic mechanisms in 
molecular evolution also in the journal Nature in 1968. He devoted his later life defending the 
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idea that evolution was driven mostly by neutral mutations in respect to natural selection thus 
making the genetic drift the prominent mechanism of evolution. His student continues his 
work but neither of their ideas have been accepted in their full form. Rather “neutralism vs. 
adaptionism” debates have been continuing in respect of which is more important in terms of 
evolution. The idea of genetic drift has been present in science for a long time and Kimura's 
theory with its novel aspects was a continuation of a tradition with its articulated problems 
and frameworks that stood on the mechanism of genetic drift. Since the “neutral theory of 
evolution” has actually been integrated to the theory of evolution in the broader sense with 
emphasis on natural selection, it remains as a special case and complements evolutionary 
theory for the time being.  
 
In conclusion, the first three examples demonstrated the characteristics brought forward by 
Kuhn to illustrate a science that was not paradigm driven. Texts were lengthy and dense with 
world building tendencies and philosophy, a very broad scope, readable by educated laymen 
and thus not written in a strict tradition of common scientific knowledge. The two latter 
examples, although very influential and novel displayed the characteristics of paradigm-
driven science: articulated narrow problems, continuation of a tradition, argumentation from 
the position of that tradition, original papers posted in niche magazines meant for a trained 
scientist, the debates following publication occur within the scientific community and not in 
the terms of cosmological abstractions. In the light of these examples, I conclude that the 
Neo-Darwinian Revolution is more accurate than the Darwinian Revolution because it was 
followed by a noticeable cultural homogeny in science. But this is not nearly enough. Without 
concentrating on the parts of the disciplinary matrix, over half of Kuhn's claims about the 
nature of science would be lost. Let this serve as one criterion for establishing whether it is 
meaningful to speak of a Kuhnian biology. 
 
 
2.2. On the Structure of Paradigms 
 
Biological phenomena seem to have little to do with the much more rigid reductionist nature 
of the phenomena studied in physics. Physics is taught with emphasis on formulae and 
relations with the practicing of problem solving (thus the great importance of exemplars); 
biology is taught more like history: students must learn gargantuan amounts of facts and their 
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relations are more of an open question for her to ponder on. Naturally, there are mathematical 
abstractions of phenomena like in every other natural science. The simple laws that make up 
part of the disciplinary matrix are not as evident in biology as they are in physics despite 
biology's obvious mathematical nature. I intend to discuss the constituents of the disciplinary 
matrix to show the reader that biology displays overall similarities with Kuhn's framework but 
also great differences when it comes to exemplars. 
 
 
2.2.1. Laws and Exemplars 
 
The discussion about the importance of laws got more precise in the 1970 Postscript where 
laws were posed as a constituent of the disciplinary matrix. Laws are an important element in 
theory reduction: Tb is reducible from Ta if Tb is logically entailed in Ta. There have been 
many models of theory reduction but most of them, stronger or weaker, have had the notion 
that Ta has to logically have the capacity to explain the laws of Tb (Brigandt, Love 2014). I 
have chosen to work in a Kuhnian framework and given how Kuhn and also Feyerabend were 
critical of the empiricists' notions of reductionism by introducing incommensurability, I will 
approach the question “Are there laws in biology?” from the perspective of function rather 
than theory. More specifically: are there statements in the general realm of biology that are 
used in the same way laws are used in physics according to Kuhn? 
 
Where do philosophers usually stand when speaking about biological laws? Ernst Mayr was 
quite known for rejecting reductionism and therefore laws (like they are generally rigidly 
understood) of biology (Mayr 1982, 19). Kuhn himself did not discuss the topic of biology. 
Robert N. Brandon thought that laws were an unsuitable term for biology and proposed the 
term “contingent regularities” be used instead (Brandon 1996: 445). Beatty has proposed his 
own theory of “evolutionary contingency” and thereby the stance that there are in principle no 
laws in biology (Beatty 1996: 435). Alex Rosenberg said there was just one law (Rosenberg 
1994) and Elliot Sober thinks there are more than one but they are not empirical (Sober: 
1997). On the surface, it seems that there are a lot of different views but they all agree on one 
point: the Positivist definition of scientific law does not hold. The differences in their writings 
stem from the different emphasis they put on the Positivist definitions of laws and what they 
think is the suitable alternative to call the relations in nature discovered by biologists. 
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I agree with Sarah Mitchell and the previously mentioned authors that if we take a strict 
normative approach to laws, biology has none. A statement like (x)(Px→Qx) where x is the 
scope of all the world during all time finds no grounding in biology. This has two reasons. 
First, generalizations like the “dogma of molecular biology” concern biological organisms 
contingently evolving on our planet, which leaves little room for absolute and timeless 
statements like (x). Secondly, laws cannot have any exceptions. Of course such a tough 
criteria is hard to meet even in a field like physics, as has been also argued by Nancy 
Cartwright (Mitchell 2000: 250)(Cartwright: 1999; cited through Mitchell 2000: 250) By 
accepting this line of reasoning as fruitless in the current paper, it would, then, make more 
sense to compare different laws. I am going to discuss the Mendelian Law of Dominance with 
the help of Mitchell's three-dimensional framework. I chose this specific "law" because most 
laws in physics are empirical and Mendel's laws are empirical. This leaves out all the 
statistical law-like statements of genetics that are a priori mathematical truths.  
 
Mitchell posited three dimensions to characterize a law: degree of abstraction, stability and 
strength from zero to one scale. She posited Goodman Coins as zero on all three scales and 
the Conservation of Mass as 0.9 on all scales. Degree of abstraction stands for how much 
"noise data" has to be removed for a pattern to emerge; degree of strength stands for the 
relation between a deterministic an probability based law; degree of stability stands for how 
stable are the conditions on which the law like pattern of causality relies on. (Mitchell 2000: 
258-260) Let us compare the stances on Mendelian Laws. Mitchell puts the laws of 
inheritance all together in one point on the three-dimensional conceptual space. In her view 
they are not abstract but quite strong and a little more stable than unstable (263). 
 
I agree with her that the laws of inheritance are not statistical laws in the sense that the 
amount of various outcomes is not high and they were not discovered by a top down method 
which is usually the case with statistical abstractions. They are definitely not abstract as they 
concern visible chromosomes and variations in the phenotype and do not need the postulation 
of abstract concepts. I do not agree on the stability issue. They are quite unstable as they can 
be subject to future change when natural selection no longer permits simple two-allele 
dominance relations. The third law of Mendel is very unstable and relies on the contingency 
of natural selection like all other laws of evolution. It also rarely applies in nature in pure 
form. It exhibits the traits of a quintessential empirical law as defined by Carnap while 
conservation of mass-energy would be the quintessential theoretical law (Carnap 1966). I 
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have not found an equivalent in physics for Mendelian laws which could be for the reason that 
if some relation in physics has such a narrow scope, it would not be considered a law as the 
standard for laws is much higher in physics. Mendelial laws, especially the third, have well 
known deviations appearing almost as frequently as the cases where they actually apply. It is 
currently no more than a matter of faith whether humans will ever be able to discover more 
fundamental laws in biology but at the present moment we have the Mendelian inheritance as 
well as statistical laws and mathematical truths like the Hardy-Weinberg Principle or the 
power law. 
 
The mathematical a prioris are a separate issue. I agree with Sober that, contextually 
speaking, we should not discard a priori statements that form the bulk of the remaining 
candidates for laws in biology (Sober 1997: 466), but in the case of the Hardy-Weinberg 
Principle, it does not exist in nature. It is an idealization and works as a comparison model to 
the data scientists actually get by studying populations. The ideal gas law in physics is a little 
similar but different in a way that it is applied as an approximation of data, not for 
comparison. The a priori laws exhibit a very low degree of strength, they are more stable than 
the Mendelian laws for they characterize phenomena that the Mendelian laws depend on and 
their abstraction level is higher than the Mendelian laws have. This places them in a distinct 
position on the three-dimensional scale, thus giving evidence of a quite different set of 
propositions about the world compared to the laws of physics. 
 
Exemplars can be found in the more mathematical branches of biology like ecology, 
population genetics, biophysics and -chemistry. The latter operate in the general disciplinary 
matrix of physics and chemistry and try to implement puzzle solving techniques from those 
paradigms to study biological quantum level phenomena – like the aspects of photosynthesis – 
or the molecular realm of metabolism. As I discussed previously, exemplars are an extremely 
important element of paradigms and their science guiding properties. In physics, exemplars 
provide the basic set of tools and skills for puzzle solving.  Biology in general does not 
exhibit exemplars in disciplines other than population genetics and physics and chemistry 
based branches. 
 
I support my claim on the position that exemplars are the experiments and historical problems 
that students learn in order to become puzzle solvers. With exceptions, biology students do 
not learn to solve exemplary problems. Rather, they are presented with myriads of 
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information that they have to learn by heart and understand that information holistically. Their 
knowledge is tested in exams by posing questions like "Describe what would happen in the 
synapse, if organism X had an overexposure to sodium?". Calculating the ion gradient of cells 
is very straight forward and simple, not requiring anything more from the student than to just 
learn the formula by heart. Ecology is learned in the same general way: by learning different 
phenomena and how to divide them into types. The exception to this is using principles from 
statistics like the power law to represent data, or formulas from epistemology.  In ecology, it 
would be the generalization that when given an infinite amount of optimal habitat, organisms 
would multiply exponentially ad infinitum. In addition, because of the great difficulties in 
reaching a consensus on whether biology has any laws (Beatty 1996; Rosenberg 1994; Sober 
1997; Brandon 1996) or whether biology is a generally reductionist science (Brigandt; Love 
2014), the field does not fit the Kuhnian model of science where puzzle solving is guided by 
exemplars, thus making exemplars the very core of science. Kuhnian science demands that 
there are laws and the representation of the natural world ties to a more or less neat web of 
relations that are reducible one way or another. Reductive reasoning within a single paradigm 
is commonplace and exemplars quite literally exemplify that fact. 
 
 
2.2.2. Metaphysics and Values 
 
I would like to briefly discuss the role of metaphysics and values as parts of the matrix. A shift 
in a paradigm obviously requires a shift in all four aspects of the matrix. I favor Dobzhansky's 
work as a good candidate for a revolutionary text for the reasons that it provided Darwinism 
with methods, mathematics and further evidence. However, in the light of metaphysics and 
values, I believe Michael Ruse is right when he claimed that there is a before and after 
Darwin, rather than a before and after Dobzhansky. The two of my previous conclusions 
support a Neo-Darwinian revolution, the conclusion I will draw from this section does not.  
 
Ruse has three points to support his claim of a metaphysical change brought about by 
Darwin’s Origin: 
a) humans are a part of the natural world,  
b) humans are shaped by natural selection, 
c) humans do not have any objective value over other parts of nature like trees or mice.  
(Ruse 2009: 10043)  
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I agree with these examples to a certain extent. All three are considered true by popular 
accounts of history but I would like to specify that the three statements are not required from a 
scientist to do acceptable science. Therein lies the rub, the shift in metaphysics and values is 
the most lucid of Kuhn's ideas and deserves separate thorough discussion, for it is unclear if 
one should focus on the changes more connected to attitudes about research and cosmology or 
on a broader change in culture outside science due to scientific work. Ruse appealed to a 
bigger cultural change in his examples and I take the same standpoint in my arguments. The 
extent to which I do not agree with Ruse, is that as far as metaphysical or value 
incommensurability goes, there seems to be an odd case of the value vocabulary's semantic 
morphing which brings about serious doubts whether there has actually been a significant leap 
in our understanding of life. I argue that there has not been a profound change in the general 
line of reasoning about the natural world, rather there has been a profound change in words. 
This is demonstrated by the cases of teleological reasoning and essentialism ever present in 
scientific discourse where in its most robust form “God” is substituted with “nature” or 
“evolution”.     
 
Ruse has insightful examples. Indeed, around the time of Darwin, the question “What is 
human?” took a turn as the nature of man became a serious topic for discussion outside the 
realm of theology and ethics. Evolutionism as an atheist approach to life was discussed by 
philosophers before the synthesis and e.g. social Darwinism became a social philosophy well 
before the 1930s when the synthesis happened. In these two cases, the addition of genetics 
provided a complementary piece of evidence for the mentioned ideas but did not facilitate any 
on its own. Genetic determinism is an upgraded addition to support hierarchic social 
structures and oppression of individuals based on their alleged traits that scientists are 
allegedly able to determine. Therefore I do not believe the synthesis provided anything more 
than support for ideas that were already in circulation in the social sphere. It is undeniable that 
there was a change in tune after Darwin. On the surface, it seems that there were significant 
cosmological changes concerning very broad and big questions like where should humans 
look for moral guidance and how to live in accord with nature. It does not seem so obvious 
when the topic of teleology comes into play. 
 
The existence of teleological thinking is embedded in the way laymen and even some 
scientists, particularly those who are strongly ideologically minded, interpret terms like 
“function” and “design”. Most philosophers of biology believe that teleological notions, 
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usually attributed to pre-Darwinian naturalists, are an ineliminable part of the contemporary 
field of biology (Allen 2009). Speaking about function and design, it becomes apparent that 
organisms or parts of organisms follow a plan that was crafted by nature. The moral 
dimension of these claims come to play when failing to execute that plan gets assigned the 
value “bad” and succeeding the value “good”. One example of this would be the moral 
pressure to procreate because it is what we do. It is what evolution meant when it created us. 
Another example is more subtle: because humans are sexual creatures, it is justified to explain 
their behavior from the basis of sexual procreation in most aspects. A third example is the 
belief that objective behavioral science should aid people in finding the best mate and to 
better society according to our “real” human nature. Even if these claims are a minority (I 
believe they are not) they are a vocal minority, mostly expressed by public thinkers, 
politicians and popular science writers alike. As their voices are heard and their ideas 
discussed, they reflect a part of our culture very present and real, and mirror the same type of 
thinking assigned to “a more primitive time”. I believe that when “natural” was once 
considered from God and in accordance with his plan (idea and form), it gave moral weight to 
claims about how humans and animals should behave. In present secular discourse and in the 
cases I just mentioned, “God” has been substituted with “nature”. The phrase “like nature 
intended” is a synonym for “like god intended”. God created us to rule over the beasts of the 
earth is a synonym for “we evolved to be the top predator, thus we have the right to treat our 
food as we please”. Grasping the contemporary scientific work on evolution gives people a 
new verbal arsenal but does not in and of itself make everyone accept evolution as a blind and 
non-teleological process in line with e.g. Dennet (2012). I cannot see any evidence to suggest 
that we have somehow broken away from anthropocentric thinking in broad terms like Ruse 
pointed. Rather I have noticed a new form of anthropocentrism from the perspective that it is 
natural for a species to use up all the resources available to them and this will not stop until a 
catastrophe happens.      
 
Teleological explanations that resemble the very discourse attributed to past eras, is still 
prominent in discussions everywhere and even in the classroom itself. It is questionable 
whether the points made by Ruse have really sunk in to society – it could be more superficial 
than we would like to admit. To completely deny a change is, of course, absurd and I support 
Ruse's view that Darwin's conclusions on humans and our understanding of our roots in terms 
of having common ancestors with other animals on this planet was a true novelty that has 
profoundly shaped our culture and intellectual life. 
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2.3. Semantic Incommensurability 
 
Semantic incommensurability is a key concept to understanding a Kuhnian revolution. In this 
subchapter, I will discuss the biological concept of species. I want to show how the concept 
has changed through time and how the use of a concept so central to a theory is able to hinder 
scientific progress and guide research in a very Kuhnian way. The history of the term will also 
reveal whether Dobzhansky’s work included a revolutionary aspect in terms of semantic 
incommensurability.  
 
Jonathan Hodge wrote about the Aristotelian way of understanding species as the embodiment 
of their purposes through their natural actions. Species as forms are preserved but forms of 
individuals originate from the forms of their ancestors – a cyclic change happening in a fixed 
domain of species; like the changing of the seasons: different but on a broader level the same. 
Species do not have origins of their own. (Hodge 1990: 374-376) Christian thought like that 
of Aquinas, Hodge characterizes, was influenced by the same Platonic and Aristotelian 
metaphysics: species are the diverse imitations of the Ideas in the divine mind and they come 
in different forms for they have to be diverse in order for the goodness of the holy mind to be 
represented on earth. Here forms are both Platonist and Aristotelian: forms independently 
originate from God and species are everlasting in their nature. All forms were brought into 
being and no new forms can come, all that can be already is. (378)  After a few centuries, this 
trend starts to change. As an Enlightenment era naturalist, Buffon's view was 
incommensurable with the previous theories of the world because he spoke not of Ideas, 
Forms nor Creation from the divine mind. His view of the world was thermodynamical: 
everything on this earth came to existence because of extraordinary circumstances in the past 
and the particulars that succeeded in keeping stable constellations are the species and 
structures he saw in nature. Since gravity was constant, he explained it as a matter of heat. 
(Hodge 1990: 374-380)  “All that can be, already is” was substituted for “things are because 
causal forces change what was”. Species no longer signified the divine design reflecting a 
structure that was ineluctable; they signified structures that came to be because of the state of 
the causal conditions in the distant past. 
 
Coming closer to Darwin, the Newtonian frameworks of Linné and Lamarck were at first 
reluctant to make any bold claims about the origins of different species, although, as geology 
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advanced, the fact that there had been older species living on earth was indisputable to these 
men. Lamarck broke away even more, claiming that the heat from earth was enough to bring 
about constant changes in species, thus further moving away from whatever staticism there 
was left in the thermodynamical cosmology of Enlightenment naturalists. By this time, the 
world is characterized by constant shifts in forces dictated by natural laws – it is fully 
mechanistic and naturalistic. Separate phenomena do not reflect God's work directly; rather 
the world in its entirety was once set in motion – with purpose – and now ticks on its own 
with the exception of human souls and morality. 
 
What was novel about Darwin? As others were reluctant to express their views on species 
origins and focused on the regions and adaptations of organisms that might give a clue where 
some species came to existence, Darwin solved the mystery of the origins of species by 
focusing on the “how?”, not “where?”. He was the product of his era, a thinker in the same 
cosmology as his predecessors, but as he decided to focus on reproduction rather than regional 
adaptation, he constructed a whole new structure of systematics which changed the concept of 
species to organisms shaped by common ancestry and selection of fixed traits. Those traits 
were adaptive and ever subject to pressures and change. There were no longer talks of fixed 
degrees of stability in nature which determine the different appearance of flora and fauna. 
Species were no longer static units with rigid boundaries in respect to their creation. The 
deconstruction of the whole web of associations about species was incommensurable with 
respect to the preceding accounts of more or less fixed sets of organisms. As Kuhn stressed, 
the inability to translate concepts comes from wide taxonomical differences about ontology 
and here it shows very clearly that this is the case.  
 
As very few people accepted Darwin's work without criticism, the already divided fields of 
biology all continued on their separate issues and programs. After some time of discord 
between organismal biology and genetics, enough evidence and theoretical fine tuning had 
accumulated for motivating Dobzhansky to unify the sciences. “/../ Dobzhansky's Genetics 
and the Origin of Species /../ is not merely a synthesis of Darwin's and Mendel's legacies, but 
of a Western tradition in theoretical population genetics and a Russian tradition in 
experimental genetics on populations,” Hodge concluded; and added that new developments 
in genetics meant a new evolutionary causal theory and that book specifically delivered on the 
evidence (Hodge 1990: 393). In this book, species were discussed on the basis of genes and 
gave rise to the phylogenetic concept of species. But is this shift significant enough to call it 
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incommensurable?  
 
I dare to argue that no. Darwin and Dobzhansky used terms with quite equal measure. Richard 
Lewontin is in agreement with me. Although famous for taking a genetical standpoint to 
illustrate natural selection at work, Dobzhansky still used the so called classical definition of 
species taken from Darwin:  
 
“Species are groups of interbreeding organisms that have been cut off, biologically, 
from sharing heredity with other species with which they share a common ancestry in 
the remote past. This reproductive isolation is the final step in divergence between 
geographically separated populations, geographical races, which were originally kept 
apart only by geography, but which have acquired during their geographical separation 
sufficient genetic difference to prevent future interbreeding” (Lewontin 1997: 351).  
 
Dobzhansky used the same concept in two separate works, A Critique of the Species Concept 
in Biology (1935) and Genetics and the Origin of Species, favoring a definition that mainly 
applied to sexually reproducing organisms. By using the concept in essentially the same way 
and by showing how genetics is able to answer questions about speciation – also a term 
relying on the works of Darwin, Dobzhansky's work exhibits no drastic change in relation to 
this concept – there is no significant incommensurable cluster of meanings that would trigger 
a holistic change in world view. He did manage to start a new discipline of evolutionary 
population genetics but it did not fulfill the requirement of a gestalt switch. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the first chapter I specified the features of pre-paradigmatic science. I also articulated the 
definition of a paradigm and explained that the circularity of the definition was a pseudo-
problem in respect to Kuhn and other sociologically minded philosophers. At the end of the 
first chapter I showed how semantic incommensurability and Kuhnian paradigm shifts as 
scientific revolutions were tightly connected, making semantic incommensurability the most 
important condition of a paradigm change. 
 
In the second chapter I compared the features of pre-paradigmatic science with the short 
history of biology and found that Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origin of Species exhibited 
far more traits of a paradigm launching text than Darwin's Origin of Species: the unifying of 
different disciplines, institutionalization of science and a solid mathematical base. The next 
step was to compare the constituents of the disciplinary matrix with aspects of biology. I 
concluded that there are far less universal generalizations about biological properties than 
there are propositions of the same type in physics about nature. When positioned in Mitchell's 
three dimensional system for laws, biological generalizations are either weak, abstract and 
unstable; or strong, particular and very unstable. I also concluded that in biology there are 
generally no science guiding exemplars of the kind that Kuhn talks about existing in physics. 
In the section about values and metaphysics I concluded that contemporary biology still 
exhibits traits of the cosmology that was there even before Darwin: it exhibits both teleology 
and anthropocentrism and the shift in metaphysics and values is not as profound as Ruse 
described. Finally I concluded that semantic incommensurability of the term ’species’ did 
come about after Darwin but this was not the case for Dobzhansky who instead used the 
Darwinian concept throughout his work. 
 
From the separate smaller conclusions I made in course of my text I can answer that neither 
Darwin's nor Dobzhansky's text alone suffices to meet all the conditions of a Kuhnian 
paradigm initiating text. Taken together they satisfy the conditions of a paradigm initiating 
text more loosely than I would like to permit, although in a significantly more satisfying way 
than separately. This brings me back to the bigger question I wanted to answer. Is it sensible 
to apply Kuhnian terms to biology? I believe Kuhn's framework has too much restrictions to 
fit biology, thus drawing away attention from the interesting aspects of it like the rapid 
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branching out in the 20th century and the role of developmental biology and the molecular 
revolution. The constituents of the disciplinary matrix did not emerge clearly and if one has to 
specifically search for phenomena to make the picture fit a certain theory, then our view of 
science is distorted rather than illuminated. 
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Kas Kuhni teadusrevolutsioonid on bioloogiale 
rakendatavad? 
 
Resümee 
 
Thomas Kuhni teost Teadusrevolutsioonide struktuur kasutati siin töös, et võrrelda selles 
sisalduvate ideede rakendatavust bioloogiale. Autor jõudis järeldusele, et Kuhni raamistik on 
liiga piirav, et bioloogia uurimisele midagi uut ja huvitavat juurde anda, sest bioloogias ei ole 
tema poolt postuleeritud tingimused rahuldaval määral täidetud. Bioloogias ei esine 
laiahaardelisi seadusi lihtsas vormis, õpilased ei tutvu teadusega laialdaselt läbi eksemplaride 
matemaatilise lahendamise ja nii väärtuste kui ka metafüüsiliste uskumuste järsk muutus on 
kaheldav. Sellegipoolest võib möönda, et võetuna eraldi suuremast teooriast on ideed 
semantilisest ühismõõdutusest ja normaalteaduse end taastootvast funktsioonist ka bioloogias 
huvitavad ja seda on väärtuslik uurida. Kõige huvitavam küsimus on see, et kui eksemplare 
bioloogias ei ole, siis mille järgi õpivad noored teadlased institutsionaalset teadust tegema? 
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Do Kuhnian Revolutions Suit Biology? 
 
Abstract 
 
Thomas Kuhn's book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was used in this paper to 
compare whether the ideas written in that book were applicable in analyzing biology. The 
Author came to the conclusion that Kuhn's framework was too restrictive to provide new and 
interesting perspectives on biology. The conditions thought by Kuhn were not met with 
enough accuracy. There are no wide-scale simple laws in biology, students do not adopt a 
paradigm with the help of mathematical solving of exemplars and the required revolutionary 
rapid change in values and metaphysics is also not self-evident. Although, taken separately, 
semantic incommensurability and the idea of normal science reproducing its foundations 
through research is interesting also in biology and worthy of research. The most important 
question that rose from this work is that if there are no exemplars in biology, how does the 
student integrate into the research tradition. 
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